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BOOK REVIEW
Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention
and International Law. By Simon Chesterman. Oxford
University Press, Inc., 2001. Pp. 295. Hard Cover. $70.00.
Reviewed by Matthew J. Madalo*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Few people will ever forget the compelling human
tragedies that were witnessed in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda during the 1990s. The numerous incidents of ethnic
cleansing and genocide caused a particular fear amongst
many that there was a breakdown of the collective security
mechanism created by the United Nations ("U.N.").1 The
United States and many European countries point to this
breakdown to justify the military action taken by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO")2 in Kosovo. This was
not the first time, however, that unilateral military action has
occurred for the sake of protecting innocent civilians. In fact,
military intervention in the name of humanitarian interests
became a common theme over the last century. From the
dawn of time, nations have used such arguments to justify
Book Review/Ethics Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 42. J.D.
candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.S., California State
University, Sacramento.
1. According to the U.N. Charter, the United Nations Security Council has
the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security. See U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1. For more information on the
United Nations Security Council, see the United Nations Web site at
httpJ/www.un.org.
2. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") is a political and
military alliance that was established on April 4, 1949. See North Atlantic
Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, available at
NATO currently consists of
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.
For more
nineteen member states from North America and Europe.
information on NATO, see the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Web site at
httpJ/www.nato.int.
*
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the use of force or military intervention throughout the world.
In his book, Just War or Just Peace?, Simon Chesterman
examines the question of the legality of humanitarian
military intervention in international law.' This book tackles
a very intriguing subject and makes a valuable contribution
to the study of international law. Mr. Chesterman provides a
thorough discussion of the emerging legal principles and
historical aspects of military intervention taken n the name of
humanitarian efforts. Moreover, he pays particular attention
to both the policy considerations and political ideology
underlying the identification of these legal rules and
principles. The book's organization is a virtue in its ability to
take the reader from the development of the legal principle of
humanitarian military intervention,4 to its supposed
application in various world crises throughout history.' But
for all the strengths the book possesses, the subject matter
that it tackles is very esoteric and is not intended for those
who are unfamiliar with international law and world affairs.
As the editor's note indicates, this book is intended for
"lawyers, historians and students of international affairs."
Nevertheless, Just War or Just Peace? provides an interesting
analysis for anyone interested in the complex legal issues
raised when states undertake military intervention in
another country.
The author begins with the basic premise that
international law and the U.N. Charter clearly prohibit
military humanitarian intervention.7
However, as Mr.
Chesterman points out, there has been a long running debate
as to whether a right of unilateral intervention pre-dated the
U.N. Charter.8 Thus, Just War or Just Peace? examines the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention in its historical and
political context to arrive at the determination of whether
3. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN
(Oxford Press, 2001).

INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAw

4. See id. at 7-44.

5. See id. at 60-215.
6. See Ian Brownlie, Preface to SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST

PEACE? HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford Press,
2001).
7. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 3, at 1. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 2,

para. 4. The U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force by States, subject to two
exceptions: self-defense and actions authorized by the U.N. Security Council.
See id.
8. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 3, at 1.
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such a right is an exception to the U.N. Charter's general
prohibition against the use of force.9 The book then examines
the unilateral military actions of the 1990's, which were
justified under the banner of humanitarian intervention, and
°
the role of the U.N. Security Council in light of these actions.
Mr. Chesterman argues that incorporating a unilateral right
to humanitarian intervention would be inimical to the
emergence of an international rule of law and would lead to
such interventions being undertaken in bad faith."

II. THE JUST WAR
Mr. Chesterman begins his discussion by examining the
genealogy of the right of humanitarian intervention." As the
author so candidly observes, "much of the historical analysis
of humanitarian intervention suffers from a lack of precision
as to what that term embraces." 3 He identifies the origin of
humanitarian intervention as emerging from the tension
between the belief in the justice of a war waged against an
immoral enemy and the principle of non-intervention as a
corollary to sovereignty. 4 He then proceeds to examine
classical writings from scholars, natural theorists, and legal
positivists to show how the notions of a "just war" and nonMr. Chesterman skillfully
intervention came about. 5
illustrates that international law did not proscribe the term
"intervention" as a means of settling disputes until the
twentieth century. 6 In other words, a nation was either in a
state of war or it was not. However, Mr. Chesterman notes
that many theorists in the Middle Ages, a period during
which some of Europe's most savage religious wars took
place, wrote of the "just war" that people were justified in
taking up arms against the wicked or on behalf of the
oppressed."
9. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. Cf. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41-45 (for
use of force actions authorized by the U.N. Security Council) & 51 (right of selfdefense).
10. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 3, at 112-62.
11. See id. at 6.
12. See id. at 1-44.
13. Id. at 7.
14. See id. at 7.
15. Id. at 7-44.
16. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 3, at 8.
17. See id. at 10-16.

692

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

As a counterpoint to the development of a humanitarian
justification for war, the author then discusses the
development of legal positivism 8 in international law. The
book traces the writings of many legal positivists and noninterventionists in order to show the historical antithesis to
intervention. 9
Finally, this chapter concludes with a look at state
practice in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to show
the paucity of evidence of a general right of humanitarian
intervention in customary international law.2° The book
proceeds to discuss the cases of several military interventions
during this era, highlighting the idea that although such
intervention on its face was humanitarian in nature, it by no
means implies that such a right is consistent with state
practice. For example, the book takes the U.S. intervention
in Cuba in 1898 as a clear example of this dilemma.2 ' The
initial intervention followed reports of atrocities committed
by Spanish military authorities attempting to suppress the
insurrection that commenced in Cuba in 1895.22 The stated

goal of the intervention was to guarantee Cuban
independence and for its part, the United States expressly
disclaimed any intention to exercise control over the island
beyond pacification of the dispute." The author adds that
legal commentators at the time were split over the genuine
motives of the United States in intervening in the conflict.24
Because of this difference of opinion, Mr. Chesterman
concludes that it is unsurprising that the status of
humanitarian intervention, as a right, was unclear at the
25
start of the twentieth century.

18. Legal Positivism is the belief that legal rules are valid only because they
are enacted by an existing political authority, not because they are grounded in
morality or in natural law. See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1162 (6th ed. 1990).
19. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 3, at 16-24.

20. See id. at 24-42.
21. See id. at 33-34.
22. Two other factors leading to the intervention were the leaking of a
particularly undiplomatic personal letter, written by the Spanish Minister to
the United States, and the untimely destruction of the US battleship Maine.
See id. at 34.
23. See id. at 35.
24. See id.
25. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 3, at 35.
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III. THE SCOURGE OF WAR

This Chapter examines two arguments that a right of
humanitarian intervention somehow survived or emerged
6
after the enactment of the U.N. Charter. The first argument
is that humanitarian intervention falls within the provisions
of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter; or secondly, that
humanitarian intervention is a form of self-help consistent
with Article 51.7 Mr. Chesterman begins the discussion by
looking at the text of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter to
clearly discern its meaning, and compares it to the argument
that somehow the provisions can be read to include the right
of humanitarian intervention. As Mr. Chesterman bluntly
puts it, "to interpret [Article 2(4)] as in any way justifying a
right of unilateral humanitarian intervention would stretch
8
even the Orwellian school of interpretation."
The chapter then proceeds to a more common argument
that the right of humanitarian intervention developed as a
customary rule of international law and that it exists in
parallel with the U.N. Charter." Mr. Chesterman outlines
the arguments in favor of a customary right of humanitarian
intervention. The first is that it is a form of self-help that
pre-dates the U.N. Charter, and the second is that it is an
emerging norm that has somehow modified the U.N.
Charter." What follows is an enlightening discussion of the
legal principles that logically flow from each argument - state
26. See id. at 47.
27.

See id. at 86. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall

refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."); U.N. CHARTER
art. 51 provides:
[Niothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
Id.
28. CHESTERMAN, supra note 3, at 53.
29. See id.
30. See id.
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practice and opiniojuris- and whether these principles apply
to establish humanitarian intervention as a customary norm
of international law." Mr. Chesterman concludes that there
is no doctrinal or historical basis for asserting the right of
humanitarian
intervention:
"As
such,
humanitarian
intervention will remain at most in a legal penumbra sometimes given legitimacy by the Security Council,
sometimes merely tolerated by states. 32
IV. 'You, THE PEOPLE'
This chapter diverges a little from the main thesis to
explore the issue of whether a right of unilateral intervention
exists to promote democracy.
The starting point is a
discussion of the emerging recognition of the right to
democratic governance in the 1980s and 1990s.33 The "right
to democracy" argument finds its strength in the number of
states committed to open, multiparty elections and new
discourses in international law and international relations,
stressing democracy as a value. 4 Again, Mr. Chesterman
begins with a theoretical discussion of basic international
legal principles that apply to this argument.
One of these principles, popular sovereignty, is
illustrative of how far the argument for intervention can be
taken.
Advocates of this "unilateral pro-democratic
intervention" theory argue that intervention to restore
democracy does not violate state sovereignty (and
international law), rather it upholds and vindicates it. 5 In
the extreme, proponents of this argument assert the view
31. See id. at 63-86. State practice refers to its understanding as an
element of international custom making international law. Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice refers to international custom, as
evidence of a general state practice accepted as law. What is sought for is a
general recognition among states of a certain practice as obligatory. See IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Oxford Press, 1998).

Opinio juris is a general practice recognized by states as a legal obligation, as
opposed to motives of courtesy, fairness, or morality. See id. at 7.
32. CHESTERMAN, supra note 3, at 87.
33. See id. at 88.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 91. Advocates of a "unilateral pro-democratic intervention"
theory argue that the term 'sovereignty' constitutes an anachronism when
applied to undemocratic governments. Id. Thus, the traditional concepts of
sovereignty are being replaced by a 'popular sovereignty' vested in individual
citizens of a state. See id.
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that undemocratic regimes lose the protection of international
36
Mr.
law by essentially voiding their sovereignty.
Chesterman sums this argument up by stating that "such a
justification of unilateral intervention to promote democracy
or other noble ends) depends on a radical reconceptualization
of sovereignty."" The argument of intervention to promote
democracy essentially would entitle a state to assert and
enforce the rights of an individual or group against another
state." Realistically, as Mr. Chesterman points out, this
argument taken to its logical conclusion paves the way for
selective application of a principal that is prone to abuse.
The chapter moves on to discuss two examples of
intervention that are sometimes characterized as being "prodemocratic": the U.S. interventions in Grenada in 198340 and
in Panama in 1989.41 The immediate obstacle in accepting
these two examples as indicative of a unilateral right of prodemocratic intervention, is the fact that they are not
supported as such, even by a significant minority of states."
Therefore, no such right could exist as a principal of
customary international law.43 Although there is some
evidence of support on the part of the United States and the
United Kingdom, upholding or restoring democracy has not
been previously asserted as an independent basis for
intervention.4 4 Mr. Chesterman concludes this chapter by
again asserting that no conclusive acceptance of a unilateral
right of intervention to promote democracy exists in state
practice.45
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. If taken literally, such a rule would render up to a third of the
world's states susceptible to intervention. See id.
39. See id.
40. On October 25, 1983, a force of over four hundred U.S. marines and
1,500 paratroopers and troops from neighboring Caribbean states landed in
Grenada, a small island nation in the Caribbean, where a violent coup had been
launched by Marxist rebels opposed to the regime of Maurice Bishop. See id. at
99.
41. On December 20, 1989, 24,000 U.S. troops began an operation to
overthrow the government of Panama and capture its head of state, General
Manuel Noriega. See id. at 102.
42. See id. at 106.
43. See id. at 109-10.
44. See id. at 106-07.
45. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 3, at 106-07. Indeed, the position adopted
in this book is that pro-democratic intervention may, in all but the most
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V. THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM & PASSING THE BATON
In chapters four and five, Mr. Chesterman turns to the
issue of the U.N. Security Council and its role in the
international legal order. Here, he examines enforcement
actions of the Security Council prior to 199046 and the
expanding role of the Security Council in the years between
1990 and 1999."7 The basic premise that Mr. Chesterman
wishes to convey to the reader is that trends established in
the Security Council during the period between 1990 and
1999 herald a new challenge to the international legal order.48
Specifically, he asserts that the U.N. Security Council, by its
actions and decisions, has blurred the boundaries of the
exception to the prohibition of the use of force established in
the U.N. Charter.49
Furthermore, he argues that the
plasticity of the circumstances in which the Security Council
may act and the willingness of states to follow through on its
behalf, threaten to undermine non-intervention as a cardinal
principle of the international legal order. ° Mr. Chesterman
traces enforcement actions throughout the Security Council's
history; he then proceeds to focus on the invocation of
humanitarian justifications for enforcement actions in the
period between 1990 and 1999.
The power of the Security Council to deal with threats to
peace and security is mandated under the terms of Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter. 1 Mr. Chesterman skillfully points
this out to show how the decision to commence enforcement
actions after 1990 have been reduced to the political will of
those states prepared to intervene and not to any clear
definition of when intervention is authorized by international
law.52 "If anything is unique about Somalia, Rwanda, and
exceptional circumstances, actually be inimical to human rights. See id. at 110.
46. See id. at 114-21.
47. See id. at 121-60.
48. See id. at 112.
49. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41-45. See also CHESTERMAN, supra note 3,

at 112.
50. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 3, at 113.
51. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39 ("[Tjhe Security Council shall determine the

existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace
and security."). See also CHESTERMAN, supra note 3, at 124.
52. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 3, at 161.
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Haiti," he argues, "it was that the United States and France
decided to act and seek [Security] Council authority to do
so."53 Mr. Chesterman points to the Security Council's actions
regarding the Sudan as evidence of the arbitrariness with
which the current international security mechanism
operates.54 Civil war has raged there for seventeen years and
yet the only resolutions passed by the Council were for
Sudan's failure to extradite suspects in the unsuccessful
assassination attempt on Egypt's President Mubarak.55
The book mirrors these same arguments in chapter five
to demonstrate that the Security Council's practice of
delegating its enforcement powers has depended more upon a
coincidence of national interest than on any procedural
legality.56 The book's strength is once again demonstrated
through the logical flow and organization of Mr.
Chesterman's argument. He begins with a discussion of the
procedures by which the Security Council delegates its'
enforcement powers. 7 Mr. Chesterman concludes that the
general trend of enforcement actions has been to delegate
them only when it coincides with the regional power's ability
to act.58 He uses the NATO action in Kosovo to illustrate the
notion that national interests have relegated Security Council
resolutions from a legal authority to a mere policy
justification.5 9 The framework of the Security Council and its
authorizing
resolutions
progression from open-ended
unilateral action at its inception to the modern method of
authorizing unilateral action supposedly in support of Council
The author is
resolutions is made clear to the reader."
persuasive in his argument because he paints a very vivid
picture of the natural progression of Security Council actions
in the 1990's. Although he acknowledges the sound policy
justifications behind the U.N. Charter, Mr. Chesterman
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 161.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 165.
See id.

58. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 3, at 179.

59. See id. at 218. The author argues that the NATO operation in Kosovo
follows a natural progression shown in other Security Council actions during
Security Council resolutions provided political support for
the 1990's.
increasingly militant rhetoric and subsequent military action taken outside its
sessions. See id. at 206.
60. See id. at 165.
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compares the present role of the Security Council to that of
the Council of the League of Nations,6 a comparison that, for
obvious reasons, is hardly flattering.
VI. CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, Just War or Just Peace? paints the
picture of an international collective security system that is
subservient to the will of its members. It may be argued that
the procedure in place at least ensures that a substantial
body of world opinion consents to a particular action.62
However, Mr. Chesterman suggests that the Security Council
is merely the sum of its members." If so, what does this
mean for the principles embodied in the U.N. Charter's
prohibition on the use of force? It seems apparent from Mr.
Chesterman's argument that the right of humanitarian
intervention is not a clear principle of international law. As
mentioned earlier, he argues that its application as
customary rule of international law neither preceded nor
survived the U.N. Charter, primarily because relevant state
practice is unclear as to the use of the term "humanitarian
intervention."64 He is quick to point out that even the most
moral and well-intentioned arguments in favor of a right of
humanitarian intervention in international law ultimately
fail because the "ends are never so clear and the means are
rarely so closely bound to them." 5
Whether or not the reader agrees with Mr. Chesterman's
arguments, he will nonetheless find Just War or Just Peace?
to be a thoroughly engaging and thought-provoking book, and
one which makes a significant contribution to the study of
international law.

61. See id. at 218 (The League of Nations was an international organization
formed after World War I to solve international disputes through arbitration,
which was eventually dissolved in 1946.).
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 3, at 42.
65. See id. at 236.

